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BREXIT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISENTANGLING 
LEGAL ORDERS 
Jed Odermatt∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 29, 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May gave notice under 
Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of the United 
Kingdoms’ intention to leave the European Union.1 This notification came 
after the British Parliament passed the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act (2017)2 earlier in the month, giving the Prime Minister the 
power to give formal notice to the Council of the European Union.3 Such 
formal notice intends to give effect to the result of the 2016 referendum in 
which 51.9% of voters voted in favor of leaving the Union.4 While this is a 
historic moment for the UK and the EU, the invocation of Article 50 TEU is 
only the start of a long and complicated negotiation process between the UK 
government and the EU. 
Since the Brexit referendum, there has been intense debate about what kind 
of relationship the United Kingdom will have with the EU upon its withdrawal. 
On January 17, 2017, Prime Minister May outlined in broad strokes what such 
a relationship might look like,5 and on February 2, 2017, the Government 
published a White Paper that provided some more detail about the UK’s 
 
 ∗ Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Copenhagen, Centre of Excellence for International 
Courts (iCourts). Jed.Odermatt@jur.ku.dk. The author would like to thank Dr. Tim Corthaut and Dr. Graham 
Butler for their comments on previous drafts. 
 1 Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister of the U.K., to Donald Tusk, President of the Eur. Council 
(Mar. 29, 2017), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf [hereinafter 
Letter to the European Council]; Anushka Asthana, Heather Stewart & Peter Walker, May Triggers Article 50 
With Warning of Consequence for UK, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:13 A.M.), https://www.theguardian. 
com/politics/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-triggers-article-50-with-warning-of-consequences-for-uk.  
 2 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, (2017) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/ 
9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf (the Act is only available in online format at the time of this writing). 
 3 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, EUROPEAN UNION (NOTIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL) 
BILL, REPORT, 2016-17, HL 119, ¶ 2 (UK). 
 4 Results, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (last visited Apr. 1, 
2017). 
 5 Theresa May, Prime Minister of the U.K., PM Speech: The Government's Negotiating Objectives for 
Exiting the EU (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-
objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. 
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position.6 The White Paper sets out twelve principles that will guide the 
process—such as “Taking control of our own laws” and “Providing certainty 
and clarity”7—which put forth the Government’s priorities, but provide very 
little in terms of substance.  
The UK further elaborated on its position in the letter addressed to the 
President of the European Council, which gave notification under Article 50 
TEU.8 The UK set out a number of “principles” that would guide the future 
negotiations. These include: respectful and constructive engagement; putting 
citizens first; working towards a comprehensive “deep and special partnership 
agreement”; minimizing disruption and giving as much certainty as possible 
for citizens, businesses, and investors; paying attention to the UK’s unique 
relationship with Ireland; and working together “to advance and protect . . . 
shared European values.”9 Importantly, the UK set out its aim of reaching a 
comprehensive agreement on economic and security issues within the two-year 
period for exit talks.  
There are two main takeaways from the UK position so far. First, Prime 
Minister May underlined the position that “no deal for Britain is better than a 
bad deal for Britain,”10 meaning that the UK is willing to walk away from a 
deal that is punitive or seen to be not in its interests. Second, the Prime 
Minister stressed that the UK will not leave the EU only to then enter into a 
similar type of relationship in another form.11  
On March 31, 2017, the European Council also set out its “Draft 
Guidelines” for negotiations, which include a list of certain “core principles.”12 
These guidelines set out that there should be a “phased approach” to 
negotiations, stressing that “an agreement on a future relationship between the 
Union and the United Kingdom as such can only be concluded once the United 
 
 6 HM GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
589189/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Print.pdf. 
 7 Id. at 5. 
 8 Letter to the European Council, supra note 1. 
 9 Id. at 4–5.  
 10 Theresa May, supra note 5. 
 11 Id. 
 12 European Council Note, XT 21001, Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification 
under Article 50 TEU (Mar. 31, 2017) [hereinafter European Council Draft Guidelines]. See In full: The EU's 
Draft Guidelines for Brexit Negotiations, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/ 
03/31/full-eus-draft-guidelines-brexit-negotiations/. 
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Kingdom has become a third country.”13 Both the UK’s principles and the 
European Council’s Draft Guidelines should be viewed as opening positions 
on how negotiations should proceed. We are not much closer to knowing 
exactly what a post-Brexit relationship will look like. 
The final deal between the EU and the United Kingdom will be shaped by 
power and interests, not by the strict application of legal rules. Article 50 TEU 
sets out the process of withdrawal, but says nothing about the most complex 
questions facing the Union and the withdrawing Member State.14 This does not 
mean, however, that law will not play a central role. One noticeable aspect of 
the public debate since the Brexit referendum is how frequently parties have 
framed their arguments in legal terms. The UK Government, EU officials, 
leaders of EU Member States, as well as the media and academics often 
discuss Brexit in terms of what is legally permissible. For example, the debate 
on issues such as whether the UK could have full access to the single market 
without accepting the freedom of movement,15 or whether the UK could start 
negotiating trade deals with third countries before it leaves,16 are not about 
what is desirable, but about what the law permits. While bargaining power and 
interests will shape the Brexit process, these are funneled through legal 
arguments and debates. The role of the law in the Brexit process can already be 
seen, for example, in the litigation in the UK over whether the Government 
could trigger Article 50 TEU through the exercise of its prerogative powers.17 
 
 13 European Council Draft Guidelines, supra note 12, at para. 4.  
 14 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 15 See, e.g., Sunder Katwala, Brexit Britain Can Balance Immigration and Single Market Access, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d9a7163e-9129-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78; Merkel: No 
British Access to Single Market Without Free Movement, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.newsweek. 
com/no-british-access-single-market-without-free-movement-510317. 
 16 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 216(2), May 9, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. See, e.g., Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, Taking Back Control 
Over Trade Policy: Art 50 TEU and the Repatriation of Trade Powers, DELI BLOG (July 6, 2016), 
https://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2016/07/06/andres-delgado-casteleiro-taking-back-control-over-trade-
policy-art-50-teu-and-the-repatriation-of-trade-powers/ (“Can the UK negotiate international trade agreements 
once article 50 TEU has been triggered? The short answer is no.”); Adam Payne, EU Leaders: ‘It’s Absolutely 
Clear’ UK Cannot Negotiate Trade Deals with Other Countries Until After Brexit, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 23, 
2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/eu-warns-theresa-may-about-post-brexit-trade-deal-with-trump-usa-
2017-1?r=UK&IR=T; Francis Hoar, The United Kingdom’s Right to Negotiate Free Trade Agreements Before 
Leaving the European Union, LAWYERS FOR BRITAIN (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.lawyersforbritain.org/files/ 
uk-right-to-negotiate-free-trade-agreements-before-leaving-eu.pdf. 
 17 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from 
Eng. & Wales); R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) 
(Q.B.) (Eng. & Wales). 
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The President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Professor 
Koen Lenaerts, predicts that there are myriad possible ways in which the 
Brexit process could come before the EU Courts,18 a view that has been 
expressed by EU law experts.19 The negotiations take place in the shadow of 
these legal arguments and debates.  
These legal debates have focused for the most part on questions arising 
under either UK constitutional law or under EU law. What has been missing 
from this debate are the possible questions that might arise under international 
law. This short contribution explores some of the ways in which international 
law issues arise through the Brexit process. Part I explores the “external” 
dimension, that is, international law issues that arise concerning the UK’s 
relationship with the rest of the world, especially international treaties entered 
into by the EU and the UK. Part II focuses on the “internal” dimension, 
examining how international law might play a role in disentangling the UK 
from the EU legal order. Part III discusses the future agreements between the 
UK and the EU, and how international law may provide some models for the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU.  
Brexit is a leap into the unknown. There are not many examples of States 
leaving international organizations, let alone of a State withdrawing from such 
a developed legal order as that of the EU.20 The closest precedent of an entity 
“withdrawing” from the European Community is the case of Greenland.21 Yet 
in that case, Greenland was not an EU Member State in its own right, so it was 
not technically possible for it to withdraw.22 Rather, Denmark sought to 
modify the territorial application of substantial parts of the EU Treaties to 
exclude EU law applying to Greenland.23 Special arrangements, such as those 
regarding fisheries and trade, were developed, and the EU Member States and 
 
 18 Duncan Robinson & Alex Barker, ‘Many Ways’ Brexit May Go to EU Courts, Top ECJ Judge Says,’ 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6609025a-adbc-11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24.  
 19 Steve Peers, Brexit: Can the ECJ Get Involved?, EU L. ANALYSIS (Nov. 3, 2016), http:// 
eulawanalysis.blogspot.dk/2016/11/brexit-can-ecj-get-involved.html. 
 20 See Ramses A. Wessel, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But Can You Really Leave? On 
‘Brexit’ And Leaving International Organizations, 13 IOLR 2 (2016). 
 21 See Henry Bodkin, Greenland Showed How to Leave Europe as Far Back as 1984, TELEGRAPH (June 
24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/greenland-showed-how-to-leave-europe-as-far-back-
as-1984/. 
 22 Maia De La Baume, Greenland’s Exit Warning to Britain, POLITICO (June 24, 2016), http://www. 
politico.eu/article/greenland-exit-warning-to-britain-brexit-eu-referendum-europe-vote-news-denmark/.  
 23 Id. 
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institutions were consulted at each stage.24 Compared with the example of 
Greenland, the withdrawal of the UK is magnified in complexity. It will not be 
simply withdrawing from an international agreement; it will be extricating 
itself from a complex legal system that over the years has become closely 
entwined with UK domestic law.25 Moreover, for decades the EU has been 
active on the international plane, entering into agreements in fields such as 
trade, fisheries, and so on. As the UK seeks to disentangle itself from these 
complex legal relationships, international law plays a role at each level. 
I. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION: THE UK AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
The legal debate since the Brexit referendum has focused on two main 
questions. The first set of legal questions relates to the Brexit process and the 
triggering of Article 50 TEU. This involves constitutional questions about who 
may give notice to withdrawal, or whether such notice may be revoked once 
given.26 The second set of legal questions relates to the type of relationship the 
United Kingdom might have upon withdrawal, and what kinds of structures 
and relationships may be put in place.27 In these legal debates, EU law and UK 
constitutional law take center stage. Yet, another set of legal questions also 
arises regarding the relationships that the EU and the UK have with other 
States and international organizations, and the legal consequences that flow 
from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The UK’s withdrawal will have major 
consequences at the international level, especially for the hundreds of 
international treaties that have been concluded by the EU and the UK with 
non-EU Member States (so-called “third States”) and international 
organizations. The EU and the UK will face an important question: what will 
happen to the many international treaties to which the EU and the UK are 
 
 24 Fisheries Partnership Agreement Between the European Community on the one hand, and the 
Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Government of Greenland, on the other hand, EU-Green., June 
30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 172) 4; see What is Greenland’s Relationship with the EU, EU INFO. CTR. http:// 
english.eu.dk/en/faq/faq/Greenland (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
 25 See Mark Elliot, The Supreme Court Judgment in Miller, PUBLIC L. FOR EVERYONE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-miller/. The discussion about 
how UK law and EU law are entwined played out in the Miller litigation, discussed in Part II. A. infra. 
 26 See Patrick Wintour, UK Must Remain Under EU Law During Brexit Transition, Diplomats Say, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/03/brexit-transition-uk-
eu-law; See also RICHARD GORDON & ROWENA MOFFATT, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, BREXIT: THE IMMEDIATE 
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES (2016), https://www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Brexit-PDF.pdf. 
 27 See Thomas Brown & Eren Waitzman, Leaving the European Union: Future UK-EU Relationship, 
HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY (Nov. 25, 2016), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/ 
Summary/LLN-2016-0063. 
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parties? Will they continue to apply to the UK as a non-EU Member State? 
The EU is generally a party to two main types of agreements. The first are 
those to which the EU is a party, but not the EU Member States (“EU-only 
agreements”).28 The second type are those agreements that include both the EU 
and the EU Member States, usually because the agreement touches upon the 
competences of both the EU and the EU Member States (“mixed 
agreements”).29 These will be discussed in turn.  
A. EU-only Agreements 
EU Member States are bound by “EU-only agreements” by virtue of EU 
law, specifically Art. 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).30 The EU concludes these agreements in its own right, without 
the participation of the EU Member States.31 This is the case, for instance, with 
agreements in the field of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) or where the EU has exclusive competence, such as agreements in the 
field of maritime resources.32 Upon the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, these 
EU-only agreements will no longer apply with respect to the UK.33 This is 
because such agreements usually stipulate that they apply to territories in 
which EU law is applied. Therefore, since EU law will no longer apply with 
respect to the UK territory upon its withdrawal, such agreements would no 
longer be binding upon the UK from the date of withdrawal.34 The EU is 
 
 28 Ramses A Wessel, The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed 
Responsibilities, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT FEATURES OF A CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE 159 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds.). 
 29 See PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 212–20 (2011). See HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY, EU EXTERNAL AGREEMENTS: EU AND UK PROCEDURES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://researchbriefings. 
parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7192. 
 30 TFEU, supra note 16, art. 216(2). 
 31 Wessel, supra note 28, at 159. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Guillaume Van der Loo & Steven Blockmans, The Impact of Brexit on the EU’s International 
Agreements, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (July 15, 2016), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/impact-brexit-
eu’s-international-agreements. 
 34 For example, Article 15(15) of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea 
sets out the territorial application of the treaty:  
This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are applied and under the 
conditions laid down in those Treaties, and, on the other hand, to the territory of Korea. 
References to ‘territory’ in this Agreement shall be understood in this sense, unless explicitly 
stated otherwise.  
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arguably obliged, however, to communicate to its treaty partners that the EU 
consists of twenty-seven Member States.35 Since the EU informs treaty 
partners when new States have joined the EU, and in some cases adopts 
protocols to include acceding Members to existing agreements,36 the EU would 
similarly be required to inform third States of an EU Member State leaving. 
Van der Loo and Blockmans also point out that the EU’s treaty partners “may 
feel cheated at the sudden loss of access to a sizeable chunk of the Single 
Market (64 million fewer consumers) and the cost and time of having to 
renegotiate a bilateral agreement with the UK.”37 The departure of such a large 
and economically important country from the EU will have an impact on those 
third countries, who might seek to either renegotiate or even withdraw from the 
agreement with the EU. For those agreements that contain a specific 
termination or denunciation clause, one party may terminate the agreement by 
giving the required notice as set out in the clause. For agreements that do not 
explicitly include such a termination or denunciation clause, such a process 
would be governed by the principles set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), in particular Article 56.38 
One could make the argument, however, that the UK continues to be bound 
by the obligations under such EU-only agreements by way of succession. 
According to this argument, the EU entered into these agreements “on behalf 
of” its Member States,39 and the international obligations would flow back to 
the withdrawing Member State upon leaving. The CJEU has held that, under 
certain circumstances, the EU may be bound by the legal international 
obligations of the EU Member States by way of succession, where they are all 
 
Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Korea, of the other part art. 15(15), May 14, 2011, O.J. (L 127) 1. 
 35 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.  
 36 See, e.g., Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other 
part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, 2006, O.J. (L 
185) 17. 
 37 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33. 
 38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 39 See Adam Łazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, The External Dimension of Withdrawal from the European 
Union, REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES (forthcoming 2017) (https://www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/research/ 
wessel/wessel122.pdf). 
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a party to an international agreement.40 However, there is no indication 
whether the opposite is the case, that is, that when competences are handed 
back to a Member State, that state would be bound by commitments entered 
into by the EU. Bartels makes such an argument with regard to the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) 2014 Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA 2014), which is a plurilateral WTO agreement to which the EU is a 
party, but the UK is not. Bartels submits that “on leaving the EU, the UK will 
succeed to the GPA in its own right, in accordance with rules of customary 
international law on the succession of States to treaties, and practice under the 
GATT 1947, which ‘guides’ the WTO.”41 There are two main arguments put 
forward in support of this. The first is based on the practice of the dissolution 
of unions and federations. In these cases, Bartels argues, the entity gaining 
autonomy succeeded to the rights and obligations of treaties entered into by the 
federation or union.42 The second argument is that the EU entered into the 
GPA 2014 “on behalf of” its Member States, and that this was accepted by the 
other parties to the agreement.43  
Łazowski and Wessel argue that there are some “serious flaws” with the 
succession argument.44 The first is that EU-only agreements do not include the 
UK as a contracting party.45 Second, these agreements are often structured in a 
bilateral way, or include commitments that can only be effectively exercised 
within the EU framework, and it might prove difficult or impossible to apply 
these agreements to the UK.46 The third issue is that automatic succession 
denies the EU’s personality as a separate and distinct legal entity in 
international law.47 Given the EU’s status as an autonomous actor in 
international law, they argue, “it is difficult to hold on to the idea that the EU 
acted on behalf of its Member States.”48 
 
 40 See Joined Cases 21 & 24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. & Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 
E.C.R. 1219, ¶ 18 (“ … in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers previously 
exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement 
have the effect of binding the Community.”). 
 41 Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO After Brexit, in THE UNITED KINGDOM: ‘FEDERALISM’ 
WITHIN AND WITHOUT (Robert Schütze & Stephen Tierney eds., forthcoming 2017) (available at https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747).  
 42 Id. at 19.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Łazowski & Wessel, supra note 39, at 13. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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International law regarding the succession of treaties gives no clear 
guidance. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties, for example, applies only “to the effects of a succession of States in 
respect of treaties between States.”49 It is questionable whether these rules can 
be applied by analogy to the context of a state leaving a regional organization. 
The examples discussed by Bartels pertain mostly to unions of states and 
federations—it is equally unclear whether these examples are appropriate to 
the Brexit context. In his report on succession in respect of treaties, Sir 
Humphrey Waldock cautioned against treating economic organizations as 
unions of states: “there are some hybrid unions which may appear to have 
some analogy with a union of States but which do not, in the opinion of the 
Special Rapporteur, form part of the present topic … One such hybrid is EEC 
[European Economic Community].”50 For the purposes of succession, it was 
argued the EEC was to be dealt with as an intergovernmental organization. 
Autonomic succession arguably has the benefit of allowing greater 
continuity in treaty relations. However, it may not always be possible to 
continue to apply certain agreements with respect to the UK as a non-EU 
member. The question of whether a leaving state will succeed to treaty 
obligations does not have a clear answer, and will depend on specific 
circumstances, and the type of agreement in question. Moreover, the fate of 
EU-only agreements with respect to the UK could be dealt with in part through 
the exit agreement that will be negotiated between the EU and the UK, which 
will be discussed in Part III, infra. 
B. Mixed Agreements 
Different questions arise in relation to mixed agreements. Prima facie, 
where the United Kingdom is a party to such mixed agreements (alongside the 
EU), the UK would continue to be bound by such an agreement under 
international law.51 However, one problem is that such mixed agreements are 
often structured in a way so that the EU Member States and the EU are parties 
together, with the EU responsible for obligations touching upon its fields of 
competence, and the EU Member States responsible for implementing the 
agreement in their fields of competence. These agreements do not specify with 
 
 49 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 1, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 6, 1996). 
 50 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Fifth Report on Succession in Respect of Treaties, [1972] 
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1. 
 51 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33. 
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any degree of certainty who is responsible for which fields. While the EU is 
often under an obligation to render a “declaration of competences,” which sets 
out who is responsible for implementing different parts of the treaty, in 
practice such declarations are worded in a vague manner giving little practical 
guidance.52 Another problem is that many mixed agreements are structured in 
a bilateral manner, with the EU and its Member States on one side of the 
agreement, and the other State or group of States on the other.53 The Cotonou 
Agreement, which involves the EU and the Member States as well as seventy-
nine countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, is structured as a 
bilateral treaty.54 This means the two sides of the agreement have legal 
obligations towards the other, as opposed to there being a set of mutual 
obligations owed among the parties. 
The continued application of agreements to the UK may depend on how 
“party” is defined in an agreement.55 In some cases, an agreement will apply to 
the EU and its Member States.56 In other instances, the UK is named as a party 
in its own right. In the latter case, the UK would remain a party to the 
agreement, but the EU and UK will likely have to inform treaty partners about 
the change in status.57 For instance, the EU and the UK are both members of 
the WTO, and will continue to be WTO members after Brexit.58 There is sharp 
disagreement, however, about what consequences this will have for the UK. 
For years, the EU has exercised powers and rights on behalf of the EU Member 
States. Questions arise regarding whether and to what extent the UK will have 
to renegotiate the terms of its future WTO membership outside the EU.59 
 
 52 See Andres Delgado Casteleiro, EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful 
Reference Base?, 17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 491–509 (2012). 
 53 See Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33 (citing Case C-316/91, European Parliament v. Council, 
1994 E.C.R. 1-625, ¶ 29). 
 54 See generally Cotonou Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 
June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3. 
 55 Thanks to Tim Corthaut for drawing my attention to this point.  
 56 See, e.g., Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the other part, June 26, 2012, 2006 O.J. (L 354) 3.  
 57 Łazowski & Wessel, supra note 39, at 15. 
 58 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE PROCESS FOR WITHDRAWING 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2016, Cm. 9216, at 15 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf. 
 59 Peter Ungphakorn, Nothing Simple About UK Regaining WTO Status Post-Brexit, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-
regaining-wto-status-post-brexit. See Bartels, supra note 41. Bartels argues that “the UK already today 
possesses full WTO rights and obligations under the WTO multilateral trade agreements, even if these are, at 
present, for the most part, exercised and performed on its behalf by the EU.” Id. 
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For these and other issues, international law does not provide clear 
solutions. Some of these questions, such as the fate of agreements, could be 
dealt with in the withdrawal agreement negotiated between the UK and the EU 
(see Part III infra). The European Council’s Draft Guidelines, for instance, 
seem to accept that after withdrawal, the UK will no longer be covered, not 
only by EU-only agreements, but mixed agreements as well: “The United 
Kingdom will no longer be covered by agreements concluded by the Union or 
by Member States acting on its behalf or by both acting jointly.”60 However, 
the Guidelines also set out that “[t]he European Council expects the United 
Kingdom to honour its share of international commitments contracted in the 
context of its EU membership. In such instances, a constructive dialogue with 
the United Kingdom on a possible common approach towards third country 
partners and international organisations concerned should be engaged.”61 The 
parties may decide, for instance, that certain agreements will continue to apply 
with respect to the UK for a specific transitional period while the UK 
negotiates and concludes new agreements. However, any withdrawal 
agreement dealing with these issues would not be capable of affecting the 
rights of third parties.62 The principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
(“a treaty binds the parties and only the parties; it does not create obligations 
for a third state”) enshrined in Article 34 of the VCLT63 is a principle of 
customary international law binding on the EU and the UK.64  
The fate of these international agreements after Brexit is not clear-cut. One 
should bear in mind that Brexit not only affects the UK and the EU, but will 
also have important consequences for the many other States with whom they 
have entered into international agreements. 
II. THE INTERNAL DIMENSION: INVOKING ARTICLE 50 TEU 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides the legal avenue for 
an EU Member State to withdraw from the EU.65 This provision did not create 
such a right—a Member State possessed an inherent right to leave the 
 
 60 European Council Draft Guidelines, supra note 12, at para. 13. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.  
 63 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 34. 
 64 C-386/08, Brita v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Hafen, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1289, ¶¶ 40–45. 
 65 TEU, supra note 14, art. 50. 
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European Union prior to the inclusion of Article 50 in the EU Treaties66—
rather, it provided a legal mechanism and process by which this right is to be 
exercised. The VCLT establishes that a party may withdraw from a treaty “in 
conformity with the provisions of the treaty.”67 While Article 50 TEU is the 
starting point for exiting the European Union, it has been debated whether it is 
the only legal avenue. Some argued that the UK might be able to “bypass” 
Article 50 TEU using international law, for instance, by invoking the Brexit 
vote as a “fundamental change in circumstances” according to Article 62(1)(a) 
VCLT.68 Such proposals were not serious. This article of the VCLT was 
deliberately worded negatively, stating that a fundamental change in 
circumstances cannot be invoked unless two highly restrictive conditions are 
fulfilled.69 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also pointed out “the 
stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of 
circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases.”70 It is unlikely that the 
CJEU would allow international law to be used in this manner, especially when 
Article 50 TEU provides a clear avenue for withdrawing from the EU 
Treaties.71 An argument can be made that Article 50 TEU was intended to 
provide the only avenue for withdrawal from the EU; therefore Article 50 TEU 
displaces other methods of withdrawal from a treaty that exist under 
international law. 
The UK has now given notice of its intention to withdraw, according to 
Article 50(2) TEU.72 The question remains whether this provision provides the 
complete and exhaustive set of rules that apply to the withdrawal process. 
Article 50 TEU is silent on a number of important issues that will face the UK, 
 
 66 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2015-6, 
HL135, ¶7 (UK). 
 67 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 54(a). 
 68 See Frank Vibert & Gunnar Beck, The Seven Days of Brexit: How a Leave Government Could Bypass 
Article 50, LSE BREXIT BLOG (June 15, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/15/the-seven-days-of-
brexit-how-a-leave-government-could-bypass-article-50/. 
 69 These conditions are “(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the 
extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” VCLT, supra note 38, art. 62(1).  
 70 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep 7 ¶ 104 (Sept. 25). 
 71 As Professor Kenneth Armstrong argues, “there is simply no way that the European Court of Justice 
would permit the autonomous legal order of the European Union and the specific procedural mechanism of 
Article 50 TEU to bend to international law in this manner.” Kenneth Armstrong, The Vote Leave Framework 
for a New UK-EU Deal: Analysis (Ctr. for European Legal Studies Working Paper No. 3, 2016), 
http://resources.law.cam.ac.uk/cels/working_papers/CELS_Analysis_the_Leave_Roadmap.pdf. 
 72 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, (2017) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/ 
9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf. 
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the EU, and international partners. To what extent can rules of international 
law or EU law come in to fill these gaps? For instance, international law 
arguments may be invoked to answer one of the most debated questions 
regarding Article 50 TEU: can notification be revoked once given? 
A. Revocability of Article 50 TEU Notification: Dodging a Bullet 
In R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Miller), 
(discussed in more detail in Part II.B. infra) the UK Supreme Court did not 
examine the question of whether Article 50 notification could be revoked.73 
The parties in the case agreed that notification could not be revoked, and the 
Court found that it was not necessary to examine that issue.74 One might argue 
that the Court was reluctant to examine this delicate question, in part, because 
it would have involved the Court interpreting the EU Treaties, meaning that it 
would arguably have had to refer the question to the CJEU.75 On this issue, it 
was in both parties’ interest to argue that notification could not be revoked. For 
the applicants, the effects of invoking Article 50 TEU were all the more drastic 
if notification is irreversible. The Government was also adamant—perhaps as 
much for political as legal reasons—that Article 50 notice is a step that cannot 
be taken back.76 The question of whether the Government might be capable of 
“reversing” its Article 50 notification remains an important one.77 This could 
 
 73 See R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
 74 Id. at [26]. 
[I]t is common ground that notice under article 50(2) . . . cannot be given in qualified or 
conditional terms and that, once given, it cannot be withdrawn. Especially as it is the Secretary of 
State’s case that, even if this common ground is mistaken, it would make no difference to the 
outcome of these proceedings, we are content to proceed on the basis that that is correct, without 
expressing any view of our own on either point. 
Id. 
 75 The preliminary reference procedure is established by Article 267 TFEU. TFEU, supra note 16, art. 
267. Experts disagree on whether the UK Courts were under an obligation to refer the question regarding 
Article 50 TEU to the CJEU. See VAUGHNE MILLER, ARABELLA LANG & JACK SIMSON-CAIRD, HOUSE OF 
COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7763, BREXIT: ARTICLE 50 TEU AND THE EU COURT 8–9 (Nov. 14, 
2016). 
 76 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [26] (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
 77 Jake Rylatt, The Irrevocability of an Article 50 Notification: Lex Specialis and the Irrelevance of the 
Purported Customary Right to Unilaterally Revoke, UK CONST. L. BLOG (July 27, 2016), https:// 
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/27/jake-rylatt-the-irrevocability-of-an-article-50-notification-lex-specialis-
and-the-irrelevance-of-the-purported-customary-right-to-unilaterally-revoke/; Charles Streeten, Putting the 
Toothpaste Back in the Tube: Can an Article 50 Notification Be Revoked?, UK CONST. L. BLOG (July 13, 
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occur, for instance, if a new Government were to win an election on the 
platform of remaining within the EU, and then sought to revoke the UK’s 
Article 50 notification. There are also some fears that the UK could “abuse” 
the right to withdrawal notification in order to extend the two-year negotiation 
period.78 Many have argued that once invoked, Article 50 notification cannot 
be revoked.79 But is this really the case?  
The applicants in Miller invoked the metaphor of Article 50 notification 
being like pulling the trigger of a gun—by giving notice under Article 50 the 
UK will be “pulling . . . the trigger which causes the bullet to be fired, with the 
consequence that the bullet will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to 
apply.”80 Three main arguments were put forward to support this argument:  
Article 50 is deliberately designed to avoid any such consequence. 
There is no mention of a power to withdraw. And the very possibility 
of a power to withdraw a notification would frustrate, again, Article 
50(3), which sets out in the clearest possible terms, what the 
consequences are of giving the notification under Article 50(2).81 
 
2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/13/charles-streeten-putting-the-toothpaste-back-in-the-tube-
can-an-article-50-notification-be-revoked.  
 78 Daniel Boffey, Barnier ‘Lobbied to Stop May Withdrawing Article 50 in Two Years,’ GUARDIAN (Apr. 
7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/07/michel-barnier-eu-red-line-theresa-may-article-
50-brussels. A European Parliament resolution has stressed that the withdrawal process could only be stopped 
with the consent of the other twenty-seven Member States. 
 79 Eva-Maria Poptcheva, Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT RES. SERV. (Feb. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/ 
EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf.  
Most commentators argue that [unilateral revocation] is impossible or at least doubtful, from a 
legal point of view. Indeed Article 50 TEU does not expressly provide for the revocation of a 
notice of withdrawal and establishes that, once opened, the withdrawal process ends either within 
two years or later, if this deadline is extended by agreement. 
Id. This analysis does not rule out the possibility of suspending withdrawal, with the agreement of the EU 
Member States and institutions. See Nick Barber, Tom Hickman & Jeff King, Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: 
Parliament’s Indispensable Role, UK CONST. L. BLOG (June 27, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 
2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-
role/. “The first point to note about Article 50 is that it is a once-and-for-all decision; there is no turning back 
once Article 50 has been invoked.” Id. 
 80 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [36] (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales) (quoting Lord Pannick QC). Lord Carnwath criticizes this metaphor as “superficially 
attractive, but (with respect) fallacious.” Id. at [262]. 
 81 Santos and M -v- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Transcripts, COURTS & 
TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2017) (follow “Full Day Transcript for 13 October 2016” hyperlink). 
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These arguments are based on a similar premise: that Article 50 provides the 
complete picture about withdrawal. It was argued that since there is no explicit 
mention of the ability of an EU Member State to revoke its Article 50 
notification, this is not allowed under the EU Treaties.82 While the EU Treaties 
are silent on the question of whether Article 50 notification can be revoked, 
one may find guidance from international law, notably Articles 65–68 of the 
VCLT.83 Article 65 provides a procedure with respect to invalidity, 
termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty, and 
Article 68 sets out that “a notification or instrument provided for in article 65 
or 67 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.”84 If one assumes that 
Article 68 VCLT represents customary international law (which is not entirely 
clear), then it would seem that a party has the right to revoke unilaterally its 
notification to withdraw from the EU Treaties.85 The UK would therefore have 
the right to withdraw its notice at any point up until withdrawal takes effect.86 
This argument is based on the premise that the law of treaties, particularly 
Article 68 VCLT, actually applies to the Article 50 TEU process.87 If one 
views the EU legal order as a “self-contained regime,”88 the EU Treaties 
provide for a complete system and remedies.89 As long as the EU Treaties 
themselves provide for a complete set of rules, recourse should not be made to 
rules of general international law, including the customary law of treaties. In 
this case, it could be argued, Article 50 sets out the entire procedure that 
should take place in the event that a Member State chooses to leave the EU.90 
 
 82 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE INVOKING OF ARTICLE 50, 2016–7, HL44, ¶ 11–12 
(UK). 
 83 Rylatt, supra note 77. 
 84 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 68. 
 85 Rylatt supra note 77. 
 86 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, supra note 66. 
 87 Rylatt supra note 77. 
 88 See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006). 
 89 In Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium the Court held that:  
[T]he Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and 
legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal order which governs the 
powers, rights and obligations of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for taking 
cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it. Therefore, except where otherwise expressly 
provided, the basic concept of the Treaty requires that the Member States shall not take the law 
into their own hands.  
Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63, Commission v. Lux. & Belg., 1964 E.C.R. 01217. See Eckhart Klein, Self-
Contained Regime, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
 90 Steve Peers, Article 50 TEU: The Uses and Abuses of the Process of Withdrawing from the EU, EU L. 
ANALYSIS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.dk/2014/12/article-50-teu-uses-and-abuses-of.html.  
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Whereas the right to revoke a notification of withdrawal under Article 68 
VCLT may make sense for a “normal” treaty, one could argue that Article 50 
introduces a specific set of rules that were designed for the situation of a 
Member State leaving the EU, displacing the application of general 
international law through the rule of lex specialis. One could make the case 
that specific rules of withdrawal were necessary in the EU context, especially 
given the drastic effects that such a move would have, not only for the 
withdrawing Member State, but also for the other members of the Union.  
Although the UK Supreme Court dodged this bullet, the question of 
revoking Article 50 notice remains an unsettled and important question. 
Litigation has been brought before the High Court in Ireland on this issue, in 
which litigants are hoping that Irish Courts will refer the question to the CJEU 
in Luxembourg.91  
B. Miller: International and European Law Issues 
The UK Government initially decided to invoke Article 50 TEU via royal 
prerogative, instead of involving the British Parliament.92 This gave rise to 
litigation before the High Court of England and Wales brought by applicants 
who argued that Article 50 TEU could only be invoked with the consent of the 
Parliament.93 On November 3, 2016, the High Court held in R (Miller) v. 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, that the British Government 
did not have the power to give notification under Article 50 to withdraw from 
the EU without involving Parliament.94 If this were not the case, the Court 
held, the Crown would be able to make drastic changes to domestic law and 
affect citizen’s rights through an action on the international plane.95 The 
Government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which delivered its 
 
 91 Dennis Staunton, Dublin High Court Case to Establish if Britain Can Halt Brexit, IRISH TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/dublin-high-court-case-to-
establish-if-britain-can-halt-brexit-1.2952654. 
 92 Gavin Barrett, Tackling Brexit in the Irish Courts is a Long Shot. But Sometimes Long Shots Work, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/26/tackling-brexit-irish-
court-long-shot-article-50; Owen Bowcott, Royal Prerogative Takes Centre Stage as Supreme Court Brexit 
Case Opens, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/05/supreme-court-
brexit-case-whose-prerogative-is-it-anyway. 
 93 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from 
Eng. & Wales). 
 94 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.), 
[94] (Eng. & Wales). 
 95 Id. at [69]. 
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judgment on January 24, 2017.96 By an 8–3 majority, the Court upheld the 
decision of the Divisional Court.97 On a separate issue, it held 11–0 that 
permission of the devolved nations within the United Kingdom was not 
needed.98  
The legal questions in Miller were ostensibly only about British 
constitutional law; they did not relate to the interpretation of EU or 
international law. Rather, the legal questions focused on the inherent powers of 
the executive (the “royal prerogative”) to act on the international plane. 
Ordinarily, the royal prerogative includes the power to negotiate and ratify 
international agreements, as well as the power to withdraw from a treaty.99 
Given the UK’s dualist system, however, such action on the international plane 
can only have domestic effect through legislation passed by Parliament.100 
Moreover, the royal prerogative may not be used in a way that removes rights 
upon individuals.101  
The UK Government argued that there is no constitutional requirement to 
involve Parliament, since invoking Article 50 TEU is a step to withdraw from 
a treaty, one that is ordinarily done through royal prerogative.102 It argued 
before the High Court that “[s]uch a notification [under Article 50 TEU] would 
be an administrative act on the international law plane . . . .”103 However, the 
High Court found that withdrawal from the EU would not only produce effects 
on the plane of international law, as is the case with other treaties, but would 
have the effect of modifying domestic law, in particular by interfering with the 
rights of individuals.104 The Supreme Court also accepted this reasoning.105 
 
 96 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
 97 Id. at [74]–[93]. 
 98 Id. at [126]–[135]. 
 99 LUCINDA MAER & OONAGH GAY, PARLIAMENT & CONSTITUTION CTR., THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE, 
SN/PC/03861 (Dec. 30, 2009), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03861. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [5] (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
 103 Detailed Grounds of Resistance on Behalf of the Secretary of State at [5], R (Miller) v. Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.) (Sept. 2, 2016). 
 104 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.), 
[96] (Eng. & Wales). “[T]he Crown cannot through the exercise of its prerogative powers alter the domestic 
law of the United Kingdom and modify rights acquired in domestic law under the ECA 1972 or the other legal 
effects of that Act.” Id. 
 105 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [69].  
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The Supreme Court further noted the unique nature of the EU Treaties and 
the way in which EU law is given effect in the UK legal order. EU law is a 
“dynamic, international source of law”:  
The EU Treaties as implemented pursuant to the 1972 [European 
Communities] Act were and are unique in their legislative and 
constitutional implications. In 1972, for the first time in the history of 
the United Kingdom, a dynamic, international source of law was 
grafted onto, and above, the well-established existing sources of 
domestic law: Parliament and the courts.106 
One of the main findings of the Supreme Court in this regard was that EU law 
is a “source of UK law.”107 The Court acknowledged that there are many 
statutes that give effect to treaties in domestic law; however, the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) goes much further: “It authorises a 
dynamic process by which, without further primary legislation (and, in some 
cases, even without any domestic legislation), EU law not only becomes a 
source of UK law, but actually takes precedence over all domestic sources of 
UK law, including statutes.”108 EU law is an “independent and overriding 
source of domestic law”109 and the ECA 1972 acts as a “conduit pipe”110 
linking EU law and UK domestic law. The Court therefore accepted the special 
nature of EU law within the UK legal system. This reflects the notion, 
developed by the CJEU in van Gend en Loos, that EU law is a “new legal 
order.”111 Given this nature of EU law as an independent source of law, the 
Government could not, using unilateral action under its prerogative “turn off” 
these effects of EU law. The Court acknowledged that in normal circumstances 
the withdrawal from a treaty on behalf of the UK would be a matter for the 
Crown.112 However, the EU Treaties have transformed from international 
 
Although article 50 operates on the plane of international law, it is common ground that, because 
the EU Treaties apply as part of UK law, our domestic law will change as a result of the United 
Kingdom ceasing to be party to them, and rights enjoyed by UK residents granted through EU 
law will be affected.  
Id. 
 106 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [90]. 
 107 Id. [60]. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. [65]. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Case C-26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Judgment, 3. 
 112 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [5] (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
ODERMATT GALLEYFINAL 4/13/2017 12:20 PM 
2017] BREXIT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1069 
treaties that have effect between States, to the constitutional foundations of a 
legal order, which, among other things, confers rights on individuals that can 
be guaranteed in other EU Member States.  
The judgment and legal discussion surrounding Miller therefore highlights 
the diverging views about the nature of the EU and EU law. Are the EU 
Treaties a form of “ordinary” international law, which is then given effect 
through the ECA 1972? This was the starting point of the Government’s 
arguments, as well as the dissenting opinions in Miller.113 Or are they, as the 
majority held in Miller,114 an independent source of law? The constitutional 
question about the exercise of prerogative powers turns on this more 
fundamental question. Moreover, Miller will not be the last of these types of 
cases.115 There will likely be many more cases involving Brexit issues before 
courts in the UK, other EU Member States, the CJEU, as well as before 
international dispute settlement mechanisms. The legal outcome of these 
disputes may depend on what conception of the EU and EU law one accepts. 
As Elliott argues, Miller demonstrates “fundamentally different views about 
the constitutional status that EU law has (and will, until Brexit, continue to 
have) within the UK’s legal system.”116 Are the EU Treaties to be dealt with in 
the same way as other “ordinary” international instruments, or are they to be 
treated as the foundations of different type of constitutional legal order?117 
 
 113 Id. [34], [159]. In his dissent, Lord Reed states that the ECA 1972 “simply creates a scheme under 
which the effect given to EU law in domestic law reflects the UK’s international obligations under the 
Treaties, whatever they may be.” Id. [187]. 
 114 Id. [65]. 
 115 For a discussion of some of these envisaged legal issues, see Phedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the 
European Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MAASTRICHT J. 209 (2013); Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the 
European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523, 530 (2012). Hannes Hofmeister, 
Should I Stay or Should I Go?' – a Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw From the EU, 16 EUR. L.J. 589 
(2010).  
 116 Mark Elliot, Analysis: The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller, PUBLIC L. FOR EVERYONE (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-miller/. 
 117 See Piet Eeckhout & Eleni Frantziou, Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading 42 (Dec. 
2016) (Univ. College London European Institute Working Paper), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/news/2016-17/working-paper-art50.  
Article 50 raises important constitutional concerns not only for the withdrawing state - an issue 
that thrives in the UK blogosphere - but also from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a 
new legal order that creates rights and duties and safeguards them through accountable 
institutions, rather than being merely an international treaty signed by states.  
Id. 
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III. THE FUTURE: THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT 
A final issue relates to the agreements that will be concluded between the 
UK and the EU (and its Member States). Under Article 50(2) TEU, the EU is 
obligated to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the withdrawing State, 
which sets out the arrangements for withdrawal “taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union.”118 This means that there 
will likely be two international agreements. The first will deal with the 
modalities for withdrawal (“withdrawal agreement”), whereas a second will set 
out the future arrangements between the EU and the UK after the date of 
withdrawal (“UK–EU relationship agreement”).  
The withdrawal agreement will have to deal with the immediate issues that 
arise from disentangling the UK from the EU legal system. These include the 
rights of EU citizens in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU, the closure of 
EU agencies in the UK, cross border security arrangements, and so on.119 On 
the EU side, the withdrawal agreement is to be negotiated according to Article 
218(3) TFEU, which sets out the procedure for the EU to enter into treaties 
with third countries and international organizations (although the UK will not 
technically be a “third country” during the negotiations).120 This also raises the 
question of whether such an agreement is to be considered a form of EU 
primary law (a “reverse accession treaty”)121 or an international legal 
instrument.  
Such an agreement is to be concluded on behalf of the EU by the Council 
acting by qualified majority.122 Since the EU Member States will not be a party 
to the withdrawal agreement, it will not require ratification by national 
parliaments.123 The European Parliament must also give its consent to such an 
agreement.124 As with any agreement concluded by the Union, the withdrawal 
agreement must also be compatible with the EU Treaties and primary EU 
 
 118 TEU, supra note 14, art. 50(2). 
 119 See ROBYN MUNRO, INST. FOR GOV’T, BRIEFING PAPER: NEGOTIATING BREXIT (2016), 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/5040%20IFG%20-%20Negotiating 
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law.125 While it is conceivable that the CJEU could be asked to give an opinion 
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU on whether such an agreement is compatible 
with the EU Treaties,126 given the tight time frame involved in negotiating and 
securing the withdrawal agreement within two years, it is unlikely that the 
CJEU would be asked to become involved. On the UK side, such a withdrawal 
agreement would also be subject to its constitutional requirements, including 
gaining the consent of the UK Parliament. 
The UK–EU relationship agreement, on the other hand, will deal with the 
relations between the UK, the EU, and its Member States following the UK’s 
departure from the Union.127 It is most likely that such an agreement will 
include not only the UK and the EU, but also the remaining twenty-seven EU 
Member States.128 Although it would be technically possible for such an 
agreement to fall within areas of exclusive EU competence, thereby excluding 
the other twenty-seven Member States, in light of recent case law, this would 
be a rather “bare bones” agreement.129 Unlike the withdrawal agreement, the 
UK–EU relationship agreement (assuming it is concluded as a mixed 
agreement) would have to be ratified by the other twenty-seven EU Member 
States.130 Also unlike the withdrawal agreement, there is no timeframe 
imposed on the UK–EU relationship agreement.131  
The UK has stated that it wants a “deep and special partnership” that would 
involve economic and security cooperation.132 It has stated its preference for 
negotiating such an agreement alongside the withdrawal agreement, and is 
confident that these can be negotiated and concluded within the two-year 
period for withdrawal discussions.133 The European Council, on the other 
hand, has shown a preference for a two-step process: the first phase is to 
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disentangle the UK from the EU and to deal with the immediate effects of 
withdrawal; the second phase will focus on the future partnership, only once 
the UK becomes a non-EU Member State.134 Whereas the UK wants to 
negotiate the two agreements together, the Draft Guidelines state that the EU 
and the Member States will only be involved in “preliminary and preparatory 
discussions” on the partnership agreement during the first phase.135  
While trade will be the main issue in any agreement on the future relations, 
it may also include other issues, such as cooperation between the UK and EU 
in areas like international security, or the UK’s involvement in certain EU 
programs (e.g., in areas of scientific research). The UK government has stated 
that it will not seek to replicate any existing “model,” such as those of Norway 
or Switzerland, favoring a bespoke arrangement.136 Such an agreement will be 
in the form of a treaty between the EU and its Member States and the UK as a 
“third country.” 
The withdrawal agreement and the UK–EU relationship agreement cannot 
possibly address all of the complex issues that will arise from the UK’s 
departure from the EU. It will be necessary for these agreements to address 
certain legal innovations, such as transitional arrangements or the 
establishment of dispute settlement procedures. The UK Government’s White 
Paper mentions the need for some type of dispute settlement mechanism to 
exist post-Brexit, but does not offer any detail on what type of arrangement it 
may seek.137 The Draft Guidelines also state that the withdrawal agreement 
should include dispute settlement mechanisms for the interpretation and 
application of the withdrawal agreement.138 In light of the CJEU’s case law on 
international dispute mechanisms, which stress the need to preserve the 
autonomy of EU law,139 and the UK’s insistence that the CJEU will not have 
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jurisdiction with regard to the UK post-Brexit, the design of such a dispute 
settlement mechanism will be another sensitive legal issue. The negotiators 
may find inspiration from the example of other international organizations and 
international agreements in designing such arrangements. International law 
could therefore provide the building blocks for these post-Brexit innovations.  
CONCLUSION 
The Brexit process involves the complicated disentangling of legal orders. 
This not only includes the UK withdrawing from the EU legal order, which has 
become closely entwined with UK law, but involves questions on the 
international level, including the UK’s relationship with third States and 
international organizations. While issues of UK law and EU law will be 
predominant in the process, this contribution has shown how international law 
issues come into play at every level. As the Miller case shows, some of these 
issues touch upon more fundamental questions, such as the very nature of the 
EU legal order. Whether such questions should be approached according to an 
international law paradigm or using a constitutionalist approach remains to be 
seen. The intense legal debate about Article 50 TEU foreshadows the types of 
disputes that will continue to arise as the Brexit process unfolds. International 
law will not just play a “gap-filling role,” however. Just as international law 
initially provided the building blocks to establish the EU legal order, 
international law will be used, perhaps in innovative ways, to establish the new 
relationship between the UK and the EU.  
